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Racing and Licensing
Allen v. Bolinsky, 654 N.Y.S.2d 777 (App. Div. 1997).
Trainer suspended after positive drug test appealed because veterinarian, not trainer, administered the drug without his knowledge at the behest of the horse's owner. The appeals court upheld the suspension because the trainer regularly used the veterinarian's services and could be considered his agent or employee.
Bulter v. Oklahoma Racing Comm'n, 874 P.2d 1278 (Ok. 1994).
Authority of the Oklahoma Racing Commission to impose a fine and suspension against horse trainer after horse tested positive for Etorphine upheld.
Catrone v. Thoroughbred Racing Ass'n, 929 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1991).
Trainer sued racing association for defamation following published reports based on allegedly stale information. Summary judgment granted and affirmed based on the qualified privilege enjoyed by the association.
Daigrepont v. State, 688 So.2d 1290 (La. App. 1997).
Jockey injured in collision on racetrack sued stewards on theory that stewards were negligent in not previously removing an allegedly reckless jockey who caused the accident. The jockey was also an immigrant working without a green card. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that although the stewards owed a duty to keep the track safe for jockeys, there was insufficient evidence that they were negligent in this instance. The court also held that there was no duty to remove a jockey because the jockey was an illegally working.
Dugan v. Delaware Harness Racing Commission, 1998 WL 960708 (De. Super.).
A statement of the limits of due process hearing rights.
Foxbroro Harness, Inc. v. State Racing Commission, 95-AP-982 (Mass. App. 1997).
Foxboro Race Track had excluded a trainer from the track, largely because of his reputation. The Racing Commission ruled that the exclusion was arbitrary, and the decision was upheld on appeal.
Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp., 48 F. Supp. 1320 (2d Cir. 1995).
Case summarizes and concludes the legal saga of horse trainer George Hadges, represented by William Kunstler, in his ultimately unsuccessful claim against Yonkers and other tracks which denied him privileges. Sanctions were imposed against Kunstler in these efforts, but reversed on appeal.
Hall v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 505 So.2d 744 (La. App. 1987).
At trainer's suspension hearing before the racing commission, the commission relied solely on the file of the steward's hearing and chemist's reports. The court held that racing commission violated the trainer's due process rights because it failed to afford him the right to cross-examine witnesses.
Lavin v. California Horse Racing Board, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (1997).
Horse owners challenged racing board "zero tolerance" rule disqualifying the wins of horses after post-racing urine samples detected minute and insignificant amounts of a depressant. The depressant, scopolamine, had apparently been part of contaminated bedding straw. The California Court of Appeals upheld the regulation despite its harsh application in this case.
Lindemann v American Horse Shows Ass'n, 634 N.Y.S.2d 697 (App. Div. 1995).
Appeals court upheld suspension of owner from horse show association which occurred as a result of owner's indictment for conspiracy to commit insurance fraud by killing horses.
Maryland Racing Comm'n v. Castrenze, 335 Md. 284, 643 A.2d 412 (1994).
Court held that racing license suspension under reciprocity statute did not require notice and hearing.
Marsh v. Illinois Racing Board, 689 N.E. 2d 1113 (Ill. 1997).
Owner and driver of standardbred horses had his license revoked for allegedly engaging in an unlawful betting scheme. He appealed the decision to the circuit court of Cook County, which stayed the administrative decision pending review. The licensing board sought an emergency order from the Illinois Court of Appeals, which set aside the stay of the circuit court. The owner/driver appealed that decision to the Illinois Supreme Court, which ruled that the Court of Appeals had no authority to set aside a lower court stay.
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Monaci v. State Horse Racing Commission, 717 A.2d 612 (Pa. 1998).
An interesting discussion of the power of the Commission to control drugs, in a case where a portion of a split blood sample was stolen.
New Jersey Racing Comm'n v. Silverman, 696 A.2d 771 (N.J. Super 1997).
Harness racing horse driver was suspended after an administrative law judge found he violated regulations. Board of judges increased the penalty after executive director of racing commission called one of the judges and requested the increase. The Court held that such ex parte communication was improper, and reinstated the original penalty.
Parker v. Ohio State Racing Commission, 1998 WL 332950 (Ohio App. 9 Dist.).
Upholding the broad power of a racing commission to determine matters not specifically controlled in rules and regulations. The case involves a "walk over" versus a "no contest."
Pernalski v. Illinois Racing Board, 692 N.E.2d (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1998).
A case about the broad discretion of the racing board to discipline the trainer.
Pickwick Farms, Inc. v. Ohio State Racing Comm'n, 644 N.E.2d 1115 (Ohio App. 1994).
Ohio statute required, as a condition of eligibility in certain stakes races, standardbreds to be offspring of stallions that stand "the entire stud season in Ohio." The court of appeals held that the statute did not prohibit a stallion from breeding in the southern hemisphere during the southern hemisphere breeding season because the "breeding season" referred to in the statute was from February 1 to July 31 of each year.
Plante v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 685 So.2d 886 (Fl App. 1996).
Veterinarian had license suspended for administering a concoction of sodium bicarbonate (baking soda) and sugar water to a standardbred racehorse just prior to a race. On appeal the veterinarian challenged Florida's statute that prohibits administering a medication or drug for purposes of affecting the outcome of a horse race or dog race. The court upheld the statute and upheld the ruling that baking soda was a drug under the statute.
Rice v. New York State Racing and Wagering Bd., 653 N.Y.S.2d 601 (App. Div. 1997).
Harness driver accused of driving his horse with lack of effort. Court upheld suspension of driver because determination of Racing Board was supported by substantial evidence.
Smith v. Board of Horse Racing, 956 P.2d 752 (Mt. 1998).
An analysis of the due process rights available to a disqualified race horse owner. Stewards disqualified horse from win after determining that the horse had interfered with another. In accordance with Montana's racing rules, which mandated that the Racing Board defer to the stewards' decision, the Board upheld the decision. The Montana Supreme Court ruled that the lack of an opportunity by the owner to be heard by the stewards prior to the ruling violated the owner's due process rights. Further, the Court ruled that the rule requiring the Board to defer to the stewards' ruling was unconstitutional as a denial of due process.
Super Sulky, Inc. v. United States Trotting Associations, 1999 WL 184056 (6th Cir. Ohio).
An interesting due process case in a close knit industry. For example: "Personal friendships are natural in a discrete community like the harness-racing world. They do not amount to proof of conspiracy." The USTA's conduct was found privileged against tortious interference with contracts and business relationships.
Tufariello v. Barry, 401 N.Y.S.2d 210, 60 App. Div. 2d 813 (1978).
At trainer's suspension hearing before the racing commission, scientific evidence was introduced without establishing reliability and documentary evidence was introduced without establishing a foundation. The court remanded for a new hearing because due process protections were not afforded the defendant.
Youst v. Longo, 233 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1987).
Harness race driver sued another driver for cutting him off in a race. Supreme Court of California held that no tort claim could be made because the prospect of the driver's winning the race was too speculative.
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